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NOTES
Immunity from Prosecution in the American
Federal System
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation
having different spheres of jurisdiction ... but it must be kept in mind
that we are one people.. .1
Every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes the privilege
against self-incrimination. It is a part of the constitution of almost
every state, and the common law of every other.2 Nevertheless, each
jurisdiction has found it necessary, or at least expedient, to compel
testimony in spite of the privilege, via the enactment of immunity
statutes.3 At least in theory the immunity statute is not to be con-
sidered a compromise with the privilege. The state takes away the
privilege, but it immunizes the witness from prosecution as a result of
his compelled disclosures. It has been suggested that mere immunity
from prosecution is no real substitute for the right of silence - that
reputation and livelihood may suffer though immunity be granted4 -
but whatever the merits of this argument be, it has been universally
rejected."
In 1892 the Supreme Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,6 an-
nounced the fundamental constitutional requirement of a federal im-
munity statute: since immunity is a substitute for the privilege against
self-incrimination, it must be as broad as the privilege, effectively
barring future prosecution. Because the privilege requires that a
man's involuntary words may not be used to convict him, it would be
expected that the same result is required of immunity statutes. "Leg-
islation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the Constitu-
tion. ' '7 Nevertheless, because of the multiplicity of jurisdictions with-
in our country, this is not the case. So long as it is a state that com-
pels the testimony and the federal government that convicts, or in
some cases, the federal government that gives the immunity and a
state that convicts, self-incriminating disclosures that a witness was
forced to make may send him to jail. The Supreme Court has con-
1. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
2. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940) (Supp. 1959).
3. Id. at § 2281.
4. See Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants (Pts. 1, 2), 55 MIcH. L REv.
163, 375 (1956).
5. See Annor., 53 A.L.R.2d 1030 (1957), supplementing 118 A.L.R. 602 (1939).
6. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Held: Immunity that merely excludes compelled testimony at
subsequent trial is insufficient. Prosecution itself must be prevented.
7. Id. at 565.
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sistently supported this rule and most state courts have adopted it.
In 1958, sixty-six years after the Counselman decision, Mr. Justice
Black was prompted to write:
Indeed things have now reached the point.., where a person can be
whipsawed -into incriminating himself under both state and federal law
even though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in the Consti-
tution of each.8
It is the purpose of this article to examine the development of
what Justice Black has thus characterized as an anomaly, and to com-
ment upon the various doctrines that have been advanced to justify it.
THE EARLY FEDERAL CASES - ERROR AND INDECISION
In 1896, the validity of a federal immunity statute was again con-
sidered by the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Walker.9  This time a
witness had been granted immunity in a federal investigation of vio-
lations of the Interstate Commerce Act in Pennsylvania. He declined
to answer questions because the immunity statute did not immunize
him from Pennsylvania prosecution. The Court disposed of this
argument upon two bases: first, that the statute was not expressly
limited to immunity in federal courts, and that to the extent that it
applied to the states the supremacy clause bound them to obey it;10
and second, that even if a bare possibility remained that state prose-
cution might follow, such a possibility was so remote that it did not
deserve consideration."
There was nothing in Brown v. Walker to suggest that a claim of
privilege under a more impending threat of state prosecution need
not be recognized in a federal court. Accordingly, lower federal
courts continued their former practice of allowing claims of privilege
founded on incrimination under state criminal laws. 2
The converse problem - threat of federal prosecution for mat-
ters disclosed under state granted immunity - received the attention
of the Supreme Court in 1905. A witness in a Kansas trust-busting
prosecution refused to testify as to a price-fixing agreement, for fear
8. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
9. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). An earlier case, United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 100 (1828), appeared to involve this problem - a claim of privilege under Virginia
law having been recognized in that case - but it was distinguished in Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 68 (1906) on the basis that the government's suit itself was brought under Virginia
law so that the problem of incrimination under foreign law was not present.
10. Brown v. Walker, supra note 9, at 607.
11. Ibid. The British case, Queen v. Boyes, 1 Best & Sm. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B.
1861) was cited for this proposition.
12. See: In re Hess, 134 Fed. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905); I- re Graham, 10 Fed. Cas. 913 (No.
5,659) (S.D.N.Y. 1876); see also In re Franklin Syndicate, 114 Fed. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1900);
In re Feldstein, 103 Fed. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1900); In re Scott, 95 Fed. 815 (W.D. Pa. 1899).
In United States v. Lombardo, 228 Fed. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1915), the court reasoned that
where a federal immunity statute was expressly limited to prosecutions "under the laws of the
United States," the rule of Brown v. Walker did not apply.
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that state immunity would not protect him from prosecution under
the federal anti-trust laws. In Jack v. Kansas"3 it was held that state
immunity could not bind the federal government, and that it was suf-
ficient that a state merely provide adequate immunity from state
prosecutions.
The following year, several cases again raised the question of
federal immunity and state incrimination. The first of these, Ball-
mann v. Fagin,"4 was the only Supreme Court decision ever to uphold
a claim of federal privilege upon an allegation of state incrimination.
State prosecutions had been pending against the witness at the time,
and the Court, not inconsistently with the theory of Brown v. Walker,
held that the claim was justified. In this case the danger of incrimi-
nation in the state court was apparent. This decision has received no
attention in subsequent cases.
Hale v. Henkel,"5 also decided in 1906, involved a grand jury in-
vestigation of violations of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The Court,
not mentioning Ballmann, said that "a danger so unsubstantial and
remote" as state prosecution did not impair the immunity granted by
the national government. Further, the Court said that British cases
had reached the conclusion that "the only danger to be considered is
one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sov-
ereignty." 16
While a third case on the subject of federal immunity and state
incrimination arose in 1906, its decision in the Supreme Court' 7 was
upon authority of the Hale case, and it did not add to the law on the
subject. Hale v. Henkel may be considered the terminal case of this
early period. The next major decision on the effect of extra-jurisdic-
tional incrimination upon the privilege against self-incrimination was
not to be handed down until 1931, and it incorporated doctrinal
changes that were only glimpsed in Hale.' Essentially, Hale v.
Henkel, like Brown v. Walker, relied upon three bases. The first
was the notion that prosecution by a state after federal immunity
had been granted was too ridiculous a possibility to be entertained by
the court; the second was that English law - from which our privi-
lege derives - recognized threats of prosecution arising only from
English criminal law; and finally, that English law was relevant in
13. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
14. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
15. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
16. Id. at 68.
17. Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92 (1906).
18. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Hale v. Henkel made it quite
obvious that under ordinary circumstances there was at least a strong presumption that prose-
cution in another jurisdiction was remote. One writer is of the opinion that the presumption
was almost conclusive by the decision of Jack v. Kansas. See Grant, Immunity From Self-
Incrimination In a Federal System of Government, 9 TEMP. LQ. 57 (1935).
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America. It must seriously be doubted that any one of these premises
was correct.
The very fact that by the turn of the century both state and fed-
eral governments had anti-trust laws,19 should have been some warn-
ing that the possibility of overlapping criminal jurisdiction was far
from remote. Certainly Ballmann v. Fagin had provided the Court
with an opportunity to see that such subsequent prosecution was mor:
than an unlikely possibility. Moreover, the British authority cited
was either not in point, or did not represent the prevalent British
view.
The British cases relied upon in the Hale and the Brown caset
were Queen v. Boyes20 and King of Two Sicilies v. W3llcox.21 In the
Boyes case there was no allegation that the witness would incriminat6
himself under any foreign law. The argument was that although the
witness had been pardoned, he could be impeached by the House of
Commons. The ruling, however, was simply that the exercise of ihis
extra-judicial device would not be probable. In King of Two Sicilies
v. WJ'illcox, the witness failed to prove that any foreign law had been
violated. The issue resolved itself to whether the witness could claim
the privilege simply because he was the subject of a foreign sov-
ereign.2 Even if the broad language in that case .be accepted at face
value, it was out of line with the accepted Briiish rule. The BritisA
courts take the position that it is the actual probability of prosecution'
in the foreign jurisdiction, rather than the fact that'the jurisdiction
is foreign, that determines the application of the privilege against
self-incrimination. This rule had been adopted before the Brown de-
cision,23 and has been applied not only to claims based upon the law
of jurisdictions within the British federal system, but equally to claimh
based upon probable prosecution in America.24 The leading reviewer
of this aspect of British law, J. A. C. Grant, sets forth a plethora of
British case law, and concludes:
As early as 1749 it had been held by all the judges of the Court of
Exchequer Chamber that a witness in an English Court need not answer
questions when the answers might -incriminate him under laws in effect
in India, and an 1840 decision has been construed as extending -the privi-
19. This was the basis of the problem in Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
20. 1 Best & Sm. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
21. 1 Sire. (N.S.) 301, 329, 61 Eng. Rep. 116, 128 (1851).
22. This view of the two cases was adopted in In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652
(1940); see also, Grant, Federalism and Self Incrimination, Pat II, Common Law and British
Empire Comparisons, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, (1958); King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox is exL
pressly distinguished in United States v. McRae, 37 L.. (N.S.) 129, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79
(1867).
23. See, for example, Heriz v. Riera, 11 Sim. 318, 59 Eng. Rep. 896 (Ch. 1840).
24. United States v. McRae, 37 I.J. (N.S.) 129, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867); see also, East
India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749) in which threat of incrimin-
ation in India was involved; and Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. 157
(1750). , , 211
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lege to cover the danger of -prosecution under the laws of Spain, the wit-
nesses being Spaniards. The contrary ruling... assuming, as I do, that it
was a definite ruling - was unanimously overruled by the Court of
Appeal in 1851.25
The error did not lie simply in inadequate study of British law;
more truly it lay in the application of the rule derived from the Brit-
ish cases. As stated by the Supreme Court, the British rule was that
the possibility of prosecution was of itself remote. Even had the
British cases stood for that, it by no means followed that the propo-
sition held true in America. The states are not a widely flung em-
pire, and however firm may be the imaginary line that separates state
from federal governments, it is unnecessary to travel to cross it. The
conclusion is almost inescapable that regardless of the merits of the
rule prescribed in these early cases, the reasoning they applied is less
than convincing.
THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
In 1931, the theory behind the Supreme Court's position, with re-
gard to federal immunity statutes, underwent a slight change. In
United States v. Murdock," the holding went beyond prior decisions
that the claim of federal privilege based on state incrimination was
capricious. The Court, in that case, said:
The -principle established is that full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is
equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self-incrimination.27
Prior to the Murdock decision, it was still conceivable that where the
danger of state prosecution was sufficiently established, that danger
would support a claim of federal privilege. With this decision, that
notion was buried. It was no longer the absurdity of the claim, but
the nature of the privilege itself, that was held to preclude the claim
of privilege. 8
The reasoning behind the Murdock case was not clear - for to
say that the privilege is satisfied by immunity from prosecution in
the jurisdiction that grants the immunity is merely to beg the ques-
tion; but a theory was supplied in Feldman v. United States.29 Here
a new issue was presented. Testimony compelled under a New York
25. Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, Part II, Common Law and British Empire Com-
parisons, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 22 (1958).
26. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
27. Id. at 149.
28. That the theory had changed was recognized by the Supreme Court in the second Murdock
case, in which it was said that not until the decision of the first case had it been "definitely
settled" that a witness in a federal court could not refuse to answer "on account of probable
incrimination under state law." United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
29. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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immunity statute, to the effect that Feldman had been kiting checks,
was introduced in a federal prosecution against him for using the
mails to defraud. The lower court refused to exclude the evidence,
and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
The distinctive operations of the two governments within their re-
spective spheres is -basic to our federal constitutional system, howsoever
complicated and difficult the practical accommodations to it may be.03
Of course the constitutionality of the state grant of immunity
need not have been considered since it was not in question. It had
been held earlier that even improperly obtained state evidence is ad-
missible in federal courts if there has been no collusion by federal
officers. In fact, that was one ground of this decision. 31 The court
did, however, comment upon the grant of immunity:
The immunity from prosecution, like the privilege against testifying
which it supplants, pertains to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction.
Otherwise the criminal law of the United States would be at the hazard
of carelessness or connivance in some petty civil litigation in any state
court.. 32
Arising out of the Murdock and Feldman cases is the doctrine that
the legal separation of state from national governments prohibits the
recognition of each other's criminal law for the purposes of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The concept of federalism underlies
the most recent decisions as well.
THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL LAW
Before considering the final stage in the development of the dual-
sovereignty doctrine, adherence to chronological order demands in-
spection of the one area in which federal immunity has been held to
bind the states. It will be recalled that the first Supreme Court de-
cision involving the conflict between federal immunity and state in-
crimination3 3 held, at least in the alternative, that a federal statute
could grant binding immunity from state prosecution. This holding
was reaffirmed in Adams v. Maryland,3 4 in 1954. Granted immu-
nity, a witness before a Senate committee investigating crime con-
30. Id. at 490.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Id. at 493. Wigmore takes a similar approach. His argument is essentially that: (1)
"It is not in the power or duty of one State, or of its Courts, to be concerned in the criminal
law of another State. For the former, there is but one law, and that is its own.... A constitu-
tion is intended to protect the accused against the methods of its own jurisdiction and no other;"
and (2) that practical considerations preclude recognition of the foreign law: "The Court of
one State knows nothing of the policies and rules of other systems; and it adds great burdens
in attempting to master them." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2258 (3d ed. 1940). It is sub-
mitted that the first argument assumes the question, and the second is simply contrary to fact.
American courts do, and sometimes are constitutionally required to, look at the law of other
American courts in everyday conflict of laws problems.
33. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
34. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
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fessed to operating a lottery, and was subsequently convicted on the
basis of this testimony by the state of Maryland. The federal im-
munity statute provided that testimony before the Senate could not
be used "in any criminal proceeding in any court."35 The conviction
was reversed in the Supreme Court, upon the construction that "any
court" includes state tribunals, and upon the theory of Brown v.
Walker, that federal law takes precedence by reason of article VI of
the Constitution.
The statute construed in the Adams case did not bar subsequent
prosecution, but only the use of compelled testimony.36 The decision
that the evidence thus compelled was inadmissible in state courts left
open the question of whether a federal immunity statute could consti-
tutionally bar state prosecution. This question was considered in
Ullmann v. United States, two years later. The petitioner tried to
evade testifying upon matters of national security before a federal
grand jury. He had been granted immunity under a statute which
bars prosecution on account of any transaction concerning which the
witness is compelled to testify, "in any court." He based his claim of
privilege, in part, upon the likelihood of state prosecution, and fur-
ther argued that since Congress had no power to prevent enforcement
of state criminal law, he could still be subsequently prosecuted by
the state. The Court held that while the federal authority exercised
was more drastic than that upheld in Adams v. Maryland, Congres-
sional power to conduct national defense was sufficient to justify the
grant of complete immunity.38
Several questions remain unanswered by either the Adams or Ull-
mann cases. To the extent that the latter case depended upon the
power of Congress over defense and security, rather than simply upon
the supremacy clause, it might not apply in any area over which the
federal interest is less pervasive. Moreover, neither of these deci-
sions negate the proposition established in the Murdock case 9 that
federal immunity need not extend to state courts to be sufficient, and
Ullmann did not involve a direct attack upon a state prosecution. If,
in the future, such a prosecution is directly tested, it is still possible
that the bulk of that opinion may be regarded as dictum.
THE CURRENT ISSUE:
ASSERTION OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT IN THE STATE COURTS
Since 1958 two cases have arisen which add to the problem of
immunity from prosecution in a federal system a new facet: whether
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1952), REv. STAT. § 859 (1875).
36. Thus, the statute was unconstitutional under Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892); see note 6 supra.
37. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
38. Id. at 435-36.
39. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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the federal privilege of the fifth amendment can be asserted in a state
prosecution. By way of background it should be remembered that
Jack v. Kansas4 held that states cannot grant immunity from federal
prosecution, and that the fifth amendment itself is not binding upon
the states.41 The contention of the claimants in the current cases is
somewhat different.
Knapp v. Schweitzer2 involved a witness who had been ques-
tioned by a New York grand jury in an inquiry pertaining to bribery
of labor representatives. He had refused to answer upon the ground
that section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act made such activity a federal
crime,48 and contended that the fifth amendment gave him the right
to refuse to testify as to the commission of a federal crime in any
court. His argument was rejected. The Court reasoned that:
To recognize such a claim would disregard the historic distribution
of power as between Nation and States in our federal system.
The essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division
of political and legal powers between two systems of government con-
stituting a single Nation.44
Further, the Court stated that the "amendment can no more be
thought of as restricting action by the States than as restricting the
conduct of private citizens. ' 45
Participation by federal officers in the state investigation had
been raised in Knapp v. Schweitzer, but the only allegation of col-
laboration in that case was that the United States Attorney had an-
nounced an intent to cooperate with the state grand jury, and the mat-
ter was not seriously considered. However, in Mills v. Louisiana,4"
the stipulated facts were that the Louisiana authorities, the United
States Attorney, and the Internal Revenue Service had collaborated
in the state grand jury investigation of bribery of public officials. 47
The majority opinion ignored the collaboration issue and decided
the case upon the authority of Knapp v. Schweitzer. Chief Justice
Warren's dissent pointed out that in Knapp, it had been said:
Of course the Federal Government may not take advantage of this
recognition of the States' autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights.
If a federal officer should be a party to the compulsion of testimony by
40. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
41. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
42. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
43. Section 302 (a) of the Taft Hartley Act makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to
make payments to his employees' representative. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1952), 61 Star. 157
(1947).
44. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958).
45. Ibid.
46. 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
47. Id. at 231-33 (dissenting opinion).
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state agencies, -the protection of the Fifth Amendment would come into
play.4
Another dissent, written by Mr. Justice Douglas,49 added that Feld-
man v. United States50 permitted federal courts to accept evidence
compelled under state immunity statutes, so that now it is too late to
wait until the federal proceeding to object. Mr. Justice Douglas con-
cluded that so long as the Feldman rule stood, the states should be
bound to recognize the federal privilege in order to adequately pro-
tect the federal right.
Accepting as true the stipulation that there was state-federal col-
laboration in Mills v. Louisiana, the present situation is indeed seri-
ous. The immunity statute, which began as a full substitute for the
privilege against self-incrimination, may now be used as a device to
prosecute persons who would otherwise have been beyond the reach
of testimonial compulsion. It must be hoped that this decision will
not be used as authority for the exclusion of claims of federal privi-
lege in all situations regardless of the extent of collaboration, for
should that come to pass, the fifth amendment would become prac-
tically a nullity in any matter of sufficient weight to warrant coopera-
tion. Irrespective of any personal opinion as to the value of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the fifth amendment remains a
part of the Constitution. It is hardly proper in a constitutional sys-
tem for the government to be able to circumvent it by connivance -
nor would such circumvention lend to national dignity. It seems dif-
ficult to believe that our federal form of government is so self-de-
feating that this consequence is inevitable.
THE FEDERALISM RATIONALE
Since the demise of the doctrine that prosecution in another juris-
diction is remote,5' the decisions have, in one form or another, been
based upon the concept that the federal form of government necessi-
tates limitation of the privilege to questions of incrimination under
the jurisdiction that grants the immunity.52 Little more has been said
than that the two spheres are separate, and that contrived immunity
in one jurisdiction should not bind the other.5 3 It is submitted that
these arguments either beg the question or are directed at "straw-
men" rather than at the real issues.
Federalism in America is not an abstract philosophy superim-
posed upon an otherwise independent Constitution. To the contrary,
48. Id. at 231-36 (dissenting opinion).
49. Id. at 236-39 (dissenting opinion).
50. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
51. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
52. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490, 493 (1944).
53. Ibid.
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it is the result of the summation and balancing of the various provi-
sions of the Constitution. The limits of the American federal con-
cept are derived, in this setting, by examining the proper function of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. One does not discern the lim-
its of the constitutional amendments by employing some extraneous
concept of dual sovereignty. The real issues in a determination of
whether the state and the federal governments must look to each
other's criminal laws under the privilege are (1) the proper scope
of the fifth amendment, and (2) to what extent the privilege against
self-incrimination is binding upon the states. It is suggested that
neither of these issues has received adequate attention.
FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL IMMUNITY
Where the fifth amendment requires interference with state prose-
cutions, the supremacy clause should permit state prosecutions to be
curtailed. The proper consideration is whether the privilege against
self-incrimination, as embodied in the fifth amendment, is satisfied
with less than complete immunity. The theory that the privilege, as
adopted from the law of England, did not look to the law of other
jurisdictions has been definitively exploded. Before the passage of
the fifth amendment, it was already the law of England that it is the
probability of incrimination in fact, rather than incrimination under a
particular jurisdiction, that controls the application of the privilege. 4
The conclusion must follow that the rule is American made -
rather than intrinsic in the privilege itself. Nothing prevents the Su-
preme Court from declaring the fifth amendment unsatisfied by a
federal immunity statute that grants less than full protection from
prosecution in state courts, or from ruling out a state grant of im-
munity that would impinge upon the exercise of the fifth amendment
in federal courts. United States v. Murdock and similar cases repre-
sent nothing more than federal constructions of the fifth amendment,
which are neither supported by history nor sensible in practice. It is
not lightly to be presumed that a constitutional privilege is easily cir-
cumvented, and it probably matters little to the victim of the present
situation that federal immunity protects him in the federal courts
while he is preparing his defense to a state prosecution. It would
seem that such an anomaly would be permitted only if the chance of
its occurring is slight, or if this result were inevitable. Obviously, it
is too late to argue that the chance of subsequent prosecution is
slight. Nor is the result inevitable since the Supreme Court can at
will construe the fifth amendment to require federal immunity to be
complete. J. A. C. Grant, in his treatment of this problem, suggests
that the present rule is the result of an immature approach to the con-
cept of federalism:
54. See notes 22, 23, and 24 supra.
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The real cause of our departure from the true English tradition has
been a strange concept of federalism that views nation and state as ,irvas.
Almost all American judicial thinking seems to be couched in these terms.
Australia, Canada, and India have avoided this mistake and regard them,
instead, as colleagues. It is they, not we, who seem to have heeded the
warning of a great American, Alexander Hamilton, who in Number 82
of The Fede-ralist insisted that "the state governments and the national
government, . ... are.. . kindred systems, . parts of ONE WHOLE."
Acceptance of such an approach should be helped in other fields as well
as we enter what should be an era of even greater governmental co-
operation.55
FEDERALISM AND STATE IMMUNITY
The problem with regard to state immunity statutes is much more
complex. The reasoning in the Murdock case, of course, would hold
that state privilege is, by definition, satisfied by state immunity; but
this is no more true of the state privilege than it is of the fifth amend-
ment. The initial question, however, upon which any further analysis
rests, is whether the privilege against self-incrimination is any part of
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The only Su-
preme Court case on the subject at hand which discusses this issue is
Knapp v. Schweitzer."6 The Court did not examine the issue anew,
but merely declared: "that such a claim is without merit was settled
,in. Twining v. New Jersey .... ,,57 It is true that Twining v. New Jer-
sey 58 so held, but that decision - landmark though it is - deserves
reconsideration in the context of immunity from prosecution. The
Twining case was decided in 1908, and espoused a view of due proc-
ess of law that is far narrower than the present construction of that
phrase. It was assumed in Twining that due process of law was sat-
isfied largely by purely procedural considerations - and the Court
reasoned that the privilege did not rank in importance with require-
ments of notice, hearing, and jurisdiction of the court. The full
growth of what is now termed substantive due process had not then
been achieved.5 9
Twining v. New Jersey, to the extent that it considered the his-
tory of the privilege against self-incrimination, underestimated its im-
portance in British jurisprudence. The Court said that the privilege
was not mentioned in any of the great British documents.6" It has
§ince been pointed out that:
55. Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, Part i1, Common Law and British Empire Com-
parisons, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 25 (1958).
56. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
57. Id. at 374.
58. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
59. For an example of the more modern treatment of due process and state criminal pro-
cedure, in terms of "civilized conduct," see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 115 (1952); com-
pare Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
60. 211 U.S. at 105-08.
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By the time of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 the privilege had
-become so well established and universally recognized that to have in-
serted it would have been very much like re-affirming the law of
gravitation.61
Perhaps even more important is the fact that the issue present in
the immunity cases simply was not before the court in Twining. That
case involved the constitutionality of the inference of guilt from the
exercise of the privilege - comment - and not compulsory disclo-
sure. It would have been quite possible to decide the case upon the
basis that the inference was consistent with the privilege. In fact, had
the inference been unreasonable, its application would have violated
the principle of due process that a state may not apply an unreason-
able inference,"' irrespective of the self-incrimination issue.
In 1947, the Supreme Court again considered the constitutional-
ity of comment upon the exercise of the privilege in a state court, and
specifically refrained from deciding the case upon the broad assump-
tion applied by an earlier court in Twining. This more recent case,
instead, turned upon the logic of the inference made. 3 Even if it be
conceded that the opinion in the Twining case is not almost entirely
dictum, the decision went far beyond the necessities of the case and
thus violated a cardinal tenet of Supreme Court practice in constitu-
tional cases. Certainly that decision should not be relied upon - as
it was in Knapp v. Schweitzer - for the proposition that the essence
of the privilege, as well as some of its federal incidents, is no part of
the fourteenth amendment.
Of course, to reject Twining v. New Jersey is not to conclude af-
firmatively that the privilege is binding upon the states. No such
conclusion can be supported within the confines of a few paragraphs.
The point is that the issue deserves reconsideration. The evaluation
of the privilege in relation to the fourteenth amendment ought to be
made upon the basis of a new look at the historical development of
the rule, and its utility in modern society. Certainly, there is enlight-
ened opinion extant to the effect that the privilege is of such impor-
tance as to be essential, inferentially, to due process of law."4 Mere
citation to an old case on another point does not satisfactorily deal
with this crucial issue.
61. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion in America, 21 VA. L RayV. 763 (1935).
62. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
63. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 465 (1947).
64. For a well-worded argument that the privilege is a fundamental safeguard of human dig-
nity, see GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). See also, Boyd v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), in which the Supreme Court said that compulsory self-incrimina-
tion was "contrary to the principles of a free government." The contrary view is suggested
in MAGUIRE, EVIDENcE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 102-13 (1947).
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WHAT OTHER COURTS HAVE DONE
While the lower federal courts for a time assumed that they were
free to allow claims of privilege based upon sufficiently established
allegations of incrimination under state law,65 they have considered
themselves bound by the Murdock decision to reject all such claims.
They have not been unanimously content, however, with their fetters.
In Marcello v. United States, a court of appeals said:
The doctrine is so strongly entrenched that it appears as futile to pro-
test as it is to expect an individual to feel that his constitutional
privilege has been safeguarded because the penitentiary into which his
answer may land him is under the supervision of the state instead of
the federal government.66
Although the majority of state courts have rejected claims of
privilege founded upon the danger of federal incrimination, in ac-
cordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court,67 a few recently
have departed from this position. The leading case, for what has be-
come a distinct minority view, is the Michigan decision, People v.
Den Uyl.68 The rule promulgated in this case is that where there is
a probability of prosecution in the foreign jurisdiction, a claim of
privilege founded upon that probability may be recognized. Since the
claimant in the Den Uyl case had already been indicted by a federal
court, and the questions put to him in the state court could have in-
criminated him in the federal case, he was permitted to refuse to
answer. The court said:
It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not subjected to
self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a State judicial
proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against him in a
Federal prosecution.69
Of course, where there is no federal case pending during the state
proceedings, the danger is less imminent. Under those circumstances,
the Michigan court does not recognize the danger as sufficient to sup-
port a claim of privilege. 70  Several other states have since adopted
the Michigan rule. 1
65. See note 12 supra.
66. 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
67. See Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1380 (1933), supplementing 59 A.L.R. 895 (1929). Recent
cases in accord with the majority are: State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104
(1956); and Application of Herlands, 204 Misc. 373, 124 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
The latter case presents the argument that any other rule would enable racketeers to avoid
prosecution by extending operations beyond the states. This argument fails in that the contrary
view is not necessarily that prosecution of inter-jurisdictional crime is barred, but rather that
in some cases, immunity be granted.
68. 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
69. Id. at 651, 29 N.W.2d at 287.
70. In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1946).
71. Florida: Boynton v. State, 75 So. 2d 211 (1954); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d
887 (1954). Kentucky: Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (1957). Louisiana:
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CONCLUSION
Far from becoming less of a danger, the possibilities of state-fed-
eral collaboration to avoid the privilege against self-incrimination
have multiplied. This decade has seen a tremendous expansion of state
and local legislation into the area of subversion, which has been ex-
tensively covered by federal law. On the other hand, the federal
gambling tax disclosure provisions are quite obviously designed to
compel disclosure of state crime, and they have been used to this
end. 3 While it has been suggested that this is most appropriately
an area for comity and accommodation,74 it would appear that such
dilution of the constitutional privilege as the majority view permits,
is justifiable only if the constitutional requirements of federalism so
necessitate. The arguments to date have been unconvincing. The
rule as originally laid down by the Supreme Court was founded upon
misinterpretation of foreign law, and upon the illogical application
of the mistakenly assumed foreign rule to the different situation in
this country. The subsequently-developed doctrine, that a federal
system requires freedom to disregard incrimination in other jurisdic-
tions, begs the question. Consideration of the historical purpose of
the privilege, its importance today, and its place in due process might
well require a modification of the current position of the Supreme
Court. If such reconsideration is not forthcoming, it is not unlikely
that the privilege will become a mere shell. As the highest court of
Kentucky has said:
We believe that to render effective the ...privilege against self-
incrimination, it is essential that it apply to prosecutions by the United
States as well as to those by the Commonwealth. To hold otherwise
would be to ignore the fact that our citizens are in a very real sense,
as well as in a technical one, citizens of both the State of Kentucky and
of the United States7
To permit the granting of immunity effective in only one jurisdiction,
in a nation composed of many, is to permit the emasculation of the
-privilege against self-incrimination. So long as we recognize the
privilege, we should strive to prevent its protection from becoming
a mere illusion.
JOSHUA J. KANCELBAUM
State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955); State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La.
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